Complete the following problems from your textbook, located at the end of each respective chapter. Save your work as a WORD document, then SUBMIT it to the ASSIGNMENT SUBMISSION link for this week. You do not need to write out the questions. However, you must write out your responses in complete sentences. Please be very thorough and detailed. This is your opportunity to "show-off" what you learned this week. Chapter 9: Question 9-3 9–3. Privacy. Using special software, South Dakota law enforcement officers found a person who appeared to possess child pornography at a specific Internet address. The officers subpoenaed Midcontinent Communications, the service that assigned the address, for the personal information of its subscriber. With this information, the officers obtained a search warrant for the residence of John Rolfe, where they found a laptop that contained child pornography. Rolfe argued that the subpoenas violated his “expectation of privacy.” Did Rolfe have a privacy interest in the information obtained by the subpoenas issued to Midcontinent? Discuss. [State of South Dakota v. Rolfe, 825 N.W.2d 901 (S.Dak. 2013)] (See Privacy.) Question 9-7 9–7. Social Media. Irvin Smith was charged in a Georgia state court with burglary and theft. Before the trial, during the selection of the jury, the state prosecutor asked the prospective jurors whether they knew Smith. No one responded affirmatively. Jurors were chosen and sworn in, without objection. After the trial, during deliberations, the jurors indicated to the court that they were deadlocked. The court charged them to try again. Meanwhile, the prosecutor learned that “Juror 4” appeared as a friend on the defendant’s Facebook page and filed a motion to dismiss her. The court replaced Juror 4 with an alternate. Was this an appropriate action, or was it an “abuse of discretion”? Should the court have admitted evidence that Facebook friends do not always actually know each other? Discuss. [Smith v. State of Georgia, 335 Ga.App. 497, 782 S.E.2d 305 (2016)] (See Social Media.) Chapter 10: Question 10-1 10–1. Types of Cyber Crimes. The following situations are similar, but each represents a variation of a particular crime. Identify the crime involved in each of the following situations. (See Cyber Crime.) (a) Chen, posing fraudulently as being from Centell, the provider of Emily’s security software, sends an e-mail to Emily, stating that the company has observed suspicious activity in her account and on her network. The e-mail asks Emily to call Chen immediately to provide a new credit-card number and password to update her security software and reopen the account. (b) Claiming falsely to be Big Buy Retail Finance Company, Conner sends an e-mail to Dino, asking him to confirm or update his personal security information to prevent his Big Buy account from being discontinued. Question 10-4 10–4. Business Case Problem with Sample Answer— White-Collar Crime. Matthew Simpson and others created and operated a series of corporate entities to defraud telecommunications companies, creditors, credit reporting agencies, and others. Through these entities, Simpson and his confederates used routing codes and spoofing services to make long-distance calls appear to be local. They stole other firms’ network capacity and diverted payments to themselves. They leased goods and services without paying for them. To hide their association with their corporate entities and with each other, they used false identities, addresses, and credit histories, and issued false bills, invoices, financial statements, and credit references. Did these acts constitute mail and wire fraud? Discuss. [United States v. Simpson, 741 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 2014)] (See Types of Crimes.) • For a sample answer to Problem 10–4, go to Appendix C at the end of this text. Cross, Frank B.; Miller, Roger LeRoy. The Legal Environment of Business: Text and Cases (MindTap Course List) (p. 209). Cengage Learning. Kindle Edition. Chapter 11: Question 11-1 11–1. Doing Business Internationally. Macrotech, Inc., develops an innovative computer chip and obtains a patent on it. The firm markets the chip under the trademarked brand name “Flash.” Macrotech wants to sell the chip to Nitron, Ltd., in Pacifica, a foreign country. Macrotech is concerned, however, that after an initial purchase, Nitron will duplicate the chip, pirate it, and sell the pirated version to computer manufacturers in Pacifica. To avoid this possibility, Macrotech could establish its own manufacturing facility in Pacifica, but it does not want to do this. How can Macrotech, without establishing a manufacturing facility in Pacifica, protect Flash from being pirated by Nitron? (See Doing Business Internationally.) Chapter 12: Question 12-1 12–1. Unilateral Contract. Rocky Mountain Races, Inc., sponsors the “Pioneer Trail Ultramarathon,” with an advertised first prize of $10,000. The rules require the competitors to run one hundred miles from the floor of Blackwater Canyon to the top of Pinnacle Mountain. The rules also provide that Rocky reserves the right to change the terms of the race at any time. Monica enters the race and is declared the winner. Rocky offers her a prize of $1,000 instead of $10,000. Did Rocky and Monica have a contract? Explain. (See An Overview of Contract Law.) Question 12-5 12–5. Agreements That Lack Consideration. ArkansasMissouri Forest Products, LLC (Ark-Mo), sells supplies to make wood pallets. Blue Chip Manufacturing (BCM) makes pallets. Mark Garnett, an owner of Ark-Mo, and Stuart Lerner, an owner of BCM, went into business together. Garnett and Lerner agreed that Ark-Mo would have a 30-percent ownership interest in their future projects. When Lerner formed Blue Chip Recycling, LLC (BCR), to manage a pallet repair facility in California, however, he allocated only a 5-percent interest to Ark-Mo. Garnett objected. In a “Telephone Deal,” Lerner then promised Garnett that Ark-Mo would receive a 30-percent interest in their future projects in the Midwest, and Garnett agreed to forgo an ownership interest in BCR. But when Blue Chip III, LLC (BC III), was formed to operate a repair facility in the Midwest, Lerner told Garnett that he “was not getting anything.” Ark-Mo filed a suit in a Missouri state court against Lerner, alleging breach of contract. Was there consideration to support the Telephone Deal? Explain. [Arkansas-Missouri Forest Products, LLC v. Lerner, 486 S.W.3d 438 (Mo.App.E.D. 2016)] (See Consideration.) Chapter 13: Question 13-1 13–1. Conditions of Performance. The Caplans contract with Faithful Construction, Inc., to build a house for them for $360,000. The specifications state “all plumbing bowls and fixtures... to be Crane brand.” The Caplans leave on vacation, and during their absence, Faithful is unable to buy and install Crane plumbing fixtures. Instead, Faithful installs Kohler brand fixtures, an equivalent in the industry. On completion of the building contract, the Caplans inspect the work, discover the substitution, and refuse to accept the house, claiming Faithful has breached the conditions set forth in the specifications. Discuss fully the Caplans’ claim. (See Performance and Discharge.) Question 13-8 13–8. Reformation. Dr. John Holm signed a two-year employment agreement with Gateway Anesthesia Associates, PLLC. During negotiations for the agreement, Gateway’s president, Dr. Jon Nottingham, told Holm that on completion of the contract he would become a partner in the firm and that during the term he would be paid “like a partner.” The written agreement did not reflect this promise—the contract read that Holm would be paid based on “net collections” for his services and did not state that he would become a partner. Later, Gateway told Holm that it did not intend to make him a partner. Holm filed a complaint in an Arizona state court against Gateway, alleging breach. Before the trial, Holm filed a motion to reform the contract to express what he had been told. Nottingham did not dispute Holm’s account. What is the basis for the reformation of a contract? Is it appropriate in this case? Why or why not? [Holm v. Gateway Anesthesia Associates, PLLC, 2018 WL 770503 (Ariz.Ct.App. Div. 1 2018)] (See Equitable Remedies for Contract Breach.) Chapter 14: Question 14-414–4. Express Warranties. Charity Bell bought a used Toyota Avalon from Awny Gobran of Gobran Auto Sales, Inc. The odometer showed that the car had been driven 147,000 miles. Bell asked whether it had been in any accidents. Gobran replied that it was in good condition. The parties signed a warranty disclaimer that the vehicle was sold “as is.” Problems with the car arose the same day as the purchase. Gobran made a few ineffectual attempts to repair it before refusing to do more. Meanwhile, Bell obtained a vehicle history report from Carfax, which showed that the Avalon had been damaged in an accident and that its last reported odometer reading was Was the “as is” disclaimer sufficient to put Bell on notice that the odometer reading could be false and that the car might have been in an accident? Can Gobran avoid any liability that might otherwise be imposed because Bell did not obtain the Carfax report until after she bought the car? Discuss. [Gobran Auto Sales, Inc. v. Bell, 335 Ga.App. 873, 783 S.E.2d 389 (2016)] (See Warranties.) Question 14-8 14–8. Implied Warranties. Harold Moore bought a barrelracing horse named Clear Boggy for $100,000 for his daughter. The seller was Betty Roper, who appraises barrel-racing horses. (Barrel racing is a rodeo event in which a horse and rider attempt to complete a cloverleaf pattern around preset barrels in the fastest time.) Clear Boggy was promoted for sale as a competitive barrel-racing horse. On inquiry, Roper represented that Clear Boggy did not have any performance issues or medical problems, and that the only medications the horse had been given were hock injections, a common treatment. Shortly after the purchase, Clear Boggy began exhibiting significant performance problems, including nervousness, unwillingness to practice, and stalling during runs. Roper then disclosed that the horse had been given shoulder injections prior to the sale and had previously stalled in competition. Moore took the horse to a veterinarian and discovered that it suffered from arthritis, impinged vertebrae, front-leftfoot problems, and a right-hind-leg fracture. The vet recommended, and Moore paid for, surgery to repair the leg fracture, but Clear Boggy remained unfit for competition. Moore also discovered that the horse had been scratched from a competition prior to the sale because it was injured. Can Moore prevail in a lawsuit against Roper for breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose? Why or why not? [Moore v. Roper, 2018 WL 1123868 (E.D.Okla. 2018)] (See Warranties.) Cross, Frank B.; Miller, Roger LeRoy. The Legal Environment of Business: Text and Cases (MindTap Course List) (p. 316). Cengage Learning. Kindle Edition. Chapter 23: Question 23-3 23–3. Business Case Problem with Sample Answer— Agency Powers. A well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided with a significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Many scientists believe that the two trends are related, because when carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere, it produces a greenhouse effect, trapping solar heat. Under the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is authorized to regulate “any” air pollutants “emitted into... the ambient air” that in its “judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution.” A group of private organizations asked the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide and other “greenhouse gas” emissions from new motor vehicles. The EPA refused, stating, among other things, that the most recent congressional amendments to the CAA did not authorize any new, binding auto emissions limits. Nineteen states, including Massachusetts, asked a district court to review the EPA’s denial. Did the EPA have the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles? If so, was its stated reason for refusing to do so consistent with that authority? Discuss. [Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007)] (See Agency Creation and Powers.) • For a sample answer to Problem 23–3, go to Appendix C at the end of this text.
