Description Watch the Youtube video: https://youtu.be/_R8492ebTVs Read and annotate Lugones (page ...
Description Watch the Youtube video: https://youtu.be/_R8492ebTVs Read and annotate Lugones (pages 26-43) Postreading Prompt: Explain a ‘big idea’ from Lugones. Some of the ‘big ideas’ within Lugones include arrogant perception, loving perception, worlds, world-travelling, being at ease, playfulness (in the agonistic sense of competition), and playfulness (in the sense of being open and creative without a specific aim, rules, mastery, winners of losers). Choose one of these ideas and type out 2-3 quotes from the reading and try to explain the idea. 1 attachments Slide 1 of 1 attachment_1 attachment_1 UNFORMATTED ATTACHMENT PREVIEW Ethics: Collected Readings 1 Andrew Pulrang | “Netflix’s ‘Crip Camp’ Is For Everyone” (2020) https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewpulrang/2020/04/08/netflixs-crip-camp-is-for-everyone/ Nomination for most repeated sentence in an article on disability culture this year: “You need to see Crip Camp!” I put off watching the new Netflix documentary, Crip Camp: A Disability Revolution. As a disability rights colleague commented on my Facebook page, “Sometimes, when a film is loudly touted as ‘it’s about disability and you should see it,’ it feels like homework.” I heard nothing but excitement about the film for months leading up to its release, and almost universal praise once it came out. Still, I hesitated. I knew a lot about Crip Camp before it even came out. I have been disabled all of my life, and I have been involved in the disability culture and activism for all of my adult life. And Crip Camp has been talked about in the disability community for months. Crip Camp follows a group of disabled youth from their summer camp experience in the early ‘70s, at Camp Jened, near Woodstock, New York, through their individual struggles to win equal rights and access for themselves, to their first collective efforts to establish and defend disability rights laws. It’s the true story of how a group of disabled people learned about themselves, explored the relationships between disability and society, and banded together to shape a different way of understanding disability. Why wouldn’t I want to watch this? Something extra both drew me to Crip Camp and also gave me pause. I went to a sort of “crip camp” myself, Camp Goodwill near Syracuse in Central New York, in the summers of 1978 and 1979. Like Camp Jened not far away, Camp Goodwill was a summer sleepover camp for kids with disabilities. Also like Camp Jened, my camp introduced me to new ways of thinking about my own disabilities and my place in a “disability community” I hadn’t known existed. And yet, even before watching Crip Camp, I sensed that there were crucial differences I wasn’t sure I could process. I learned a lot at my “crip camp.” Maybe the most important was simply living and Ethics: Collected Readings 2 taking care of myself without my parents. It’s something every kid who goes to sleepover camp learns, but disabled kids don’t take for granted. It’s also a lesson with enormous future payoffs. I learned other things, too. I found that [1] while disabled people are radically different from each other, we all know what it’s like to be underestimated and not taken seriously, by others and by ourselves, too. I learned that [2] disabled people can be fun and funny, or annoying and mean, in ways that aren’t necessarily determined by our disabilities. And I learned that it’s possible to be [3] treated like a full, three-dimensional human being while our disabilities are also acknowledged and not downplayed or studiously masked. I didn’t realize it at the time, but Camp Goodwill is where I started to understand that being a person and being a disabled person is not an either-or proposition. It wasn’t all a positive experience from day one. Much like Shane Bercaw describes in his and his fiance’s YouTube review of Crip Camp, my first reaction to meeting other disabled kids wasn’t joy, but alienation. It took awhile for me to confront my own internal ableism, something I still struggle with to this day. Some of the Jened campers talk about a similar uncomfortable reaction to being introduced to other disabled people. So, while my own camp wasn’t quite as profound and historically significant as Camp Jened, it helped me relate to Crip Camp on many levels. I needn’t have procrastinated. I loved Crip Camp from beginning to end. But you don’t have to be a disability activist, deeply embedded in disability culture, or even disabled at all to appreciate and learn things from Crip Camp. Here are a few ideas to look out for: The aesthetics of disability are complex. Images of disabled people are hotly contested territories. What does a “positive” picture of disability look like? Is it healthy cleanliness, affluent respectability, happy productivity, good behavior, and smiles? Is dirt, disorder, transgression, and a little danger always bad? How do we tell the difference between neglectful squalor and joyful chaos? Almost incidentally, Crip Camp challenges us to question what we think we are seeing in images of disability. Just compare Camp Jened’s hilarious crisis with crabs, the squalid Ethics: Collected Readings 3 horrors of Willowbrook, and the bracing hardships of the 504 sit-ins. Less discerning viewers might at first have trouble distinguishing between them. But these scenes and experiences are fundamentally different, pointing to the true meaning of independent living for people with disabilities. Layers of privilege and prejudice exist among disabled people too. Over and over, the disabled campers and counselors of Camp Jened discover and confront their own unconscious privileges and prejudices. Some disabled people come with compensating layers of economic and social privilege, and aren’t aware of how other disabled people like them suffer far worse conditions and discrimination. The true depths of ableism are often as much of a revelation for disabled people as for anyone else. The disability community itself is also hierarchical between disability types, despite efforts to foster equality and cooperation. Campers’ frank talk about the social dominance of “the polios” over “the CPs” is revealing, and rarely shown in mainstream depictions of disability culture. Several times we see the campers and activists of Crip Camp striving to include not only physically disabled people, but blind, deaf, and intellectually disabled people as well. They don’t always succeed, but the best results usually come when they do. These distinctions among disabled people are still powerfully divisive and intensely debated, but rarely introduced in any formal way to most actual disabled people themselves … certainly not to young disabled kids or to adults who acquire disabilities for the first time. That’s part of what made the campers of Camp Jened such effective activists later on. They had the rare chance early on to confront their own limited perspectives and expand their horizons. Disability pride and rights don’t come automatically to disabled people. A sense of chance and luck lingers around Crip Camp. It seems like nobody planned for Camp Jened to be such a powerfully formative experience … beyond having a lot of fun, making friends, and comparing notes on being disabled kids in early ‘70s America. Certainly nobody saw it as a deliberate training ground for a future political movement. The thing is, simply being disabled doesn’t automatically lead you to the same discoveries that made Camp Jened such a tight-knit community, or to the conclusions Ethics: Collected Readings 4 that lead the campers to disability activism. Millions of disabled people go their whole lives with entirely different ideas about disability and what it means … or no ideas about disability at all. Planned or not, it took a certain kind of environment, with loose rules, an open structure, and an interest in honest sharing, to produce the results seen in Crip Camp. Camp Jened gave disabled youth a chance to discuss and argue among themselves how to interpret their experiences. Through hashing out feelings about their parents “overprotectiveness.” the kinds of risks they do and don’t value, and their shared craving for both privacy and physical freedom, the campers start to develop an idea of what their lives can be. And when real life falls so dramatically short, it spurs them on to close the gap through activism. Then the process of activism itself helps them let go of the social and emotional baggage so many disabled people carry. This is especially true of the shame and the pressure disabled people feel to normalize, to sidestep and obscure our disabilities as a way to “overcome” them. The disabled people of Crip Camp don’t often say it so plainly, but they discover and embrace disability pride. Most disabled people are weighed down by ableism. And while disability itself teaches valuable lessons, it usually takes something more than just experience to change how we view our own disabilities. Which suggests an important question: how can we help more disabled people today to make these kinds of empowering discoveries? Today’s disability rights laws and expectations were not granted out of good will. They were defined and won by disabled people themselves. Late in the film, a TV news anchor asks Judy Heumann, one of the Jened campers and a key leader in the disability rights movement, “… are you still as upset and angry as you were then?” It’s an important question, phrased in a pretty typical if insulting way. This is part of the disability activist stereotype: we are always “upset and angry” about something. But the question also helps frame the second half of Crip Camp, which traces the early history of the disability rights movement in the United States through five main stages: 1. The disabled youth of Camp Jened individually confront the barriers they Ethics: Collected Readings 5 encounter as young adults. 2. They reconnect and form a wider movement to establish the first federal disability rights law, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 3. They fight again to get Section 504 regulations implemented. 4. They fight back to protect these regulations from repeal. 5. They fight once again, on a much larger scale, to pass a more ambitious and powerful disability rights law, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Crip Camp makes it clear that none of this happened in the normal course of politics as usual. Not one of these milestones was an inevitable result of natural public enlightenment or kindness. Disabled people made them happen, intentionally, and at every step against widespread public apathy, incomprehension, and hostility. It didn’t even make much difference which political party was in charge or which ideology was in vogue. President Nixon initially vetoed Section 504, but it was Carter’s H.E.W. Secretary who refused to enact the regulations until shamed into doing so. Reagan threatened to eliminate the 504 regulations, but his successor, Bush, Sr. proudly signed the ADA into law. There’s a lesson of some kind there, too. Finally, Crip Camp gives needed depth to the typical portrait of disability activism. The people we meet in the film were and are lovely people in every way that matters. But they aren’t sweet and ingratiating poster children, always on their best behavior. They were and are messy, complex, sometimes confused, always evolving, angry, confrontational, and ruthlessly strategic. Recent reviews of Crip Camp point out added layers of meaning as the documentary’s Netflix debut coincided with the coronavirus pandemic. This can prompt decidedly mixed feelings. The film is almost irresistibly uplifting, and we all need that right now. Still, it’s hard not to feel like we’ve suddenly gone back in time to when the Jened campers and counselors struggled to foster the barest rudiments of respect and civil rights. When state governments feel justified formally placing disabled people at a lower priority for COVID-19 treatment, how far have we really come? On the other hand, Crip Camp is a testament to disabled people’s grit and resilience in the face of both thoughtless neglect and intentional discrimination. Ethics: Collected Readings 6 Crip Camp had me grinning from beginning to end. But I am upset that I knew nothing of all of these events until 10 and 20 years later, even though I grew up with disabilities at exactly this time and attended a “crip camp” of my own. I blame myself and my own internal ableism as much as anything. I might have turned away if anyone had tried to tell me these stories in my youth. Maybe someone did and I’ve forgotten it. Maybe it’s something that each of us has to discover on our own, on our own schedule. Or maybe a film like this, on a popular platform like Netflix, is the best way ... or the only way … to impart this history to the people who need it most, whether they have disabilities or not. Ethics: Collected Readings 7 Mark Dimmock and Andrew Fisher | Virtue Ethics (2017)| Ethics for A-Level Link: https://books.openbookpublishers.com/10.11647/obp.0125/ch3.xhtml#_idTextAnchor161 Aristotle (384–322 BC) was a scholar in disciplines such as ethics, metaphysics, biology and botany, amongst others. It is fitting, therefore, that his moral philosophy is based around assessing the broad characters of human beings rather than assessing singular acts in isolation. Indeed, this is what separates Aristotelian Virtue Ethics from both Utilitarianism and Kantian Ethics. The Function Argument Aristotle was a teleologist, a term related to, but not to be confused with, the label “teleological” as applied to normative ethical theories such as Utilitarianism. Aristotle was a teleologist because he believed that every object has what he referred to as a final cause. The Greek term telos refers to what we might call a purpose, goal, end or true final function of an object. Indeed, those of you studying Aristotle in units related to the Philosophy of Religion may recognise the link between Aristotle’s general teleological worldview and his study of ethics. Aristotle claims that “…for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the function”. Aristotle’s claim is essentially that in achieving its function, goal or end, an object achieves its own good. Every object has this type of a true function and so every object has a way of achieving goodness. The telos of a chair, for example, may be to provide a seat and a chair is a good chair when it supports the curvature of the human bottom without collapsing under the strain. Equally, says Aristotle, what makes good sculptors, artists and flautists is the successful and appropriate performance of their functions as sculptors, artists and flautists. This teleological (function and purpose) based worldview is the necessary backdrop to understanding Aristotle’s ethical reasoning. For, just as a chair has a true function or end, so Aristotle believes human beings have a telos. Aristotle identifies what the good for a human being is in virtue of working out what the function of a human being is, as per his Function Argument. Ethics: Collected Readings 8 1. All objects have a telos. 2. An object is good when it properly secures its telos. Given the above, hopefully these steps of the argument are clear so far. At this point, Aristotle directs his thinking towards human beings specifically. 3. The telos of a human being is to reason. 4. The good for a human being is, therefore, acting in accordance with reason. In working out our true function, Aristotle looks to that feature that separates man from other living animals. According to Aristotle, what separates mankind from the rest of the world is our ability not only to reason but to act on reasons. Thus, just as the function of a chair can be derived from its uniquely differentiating characteristic, so the function of a human being is related to our uniquely differentiating characteristic and we achieve the good when we act in accordance with this true function or telos. The notion that man has a true function may sound odd, particularly if you do not have a religious worldview of your own. However, to you especially Aristotle wrote that “…as eye, hand, foot and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these?” On the basis that we would ascribe a function to our constituent parts — we know what makes a good kidney for example — so too Aristotle thinks it far from unreasonable that we have a function as a whole. Indeed, this may be plausible if we consider other objects. The component parts of a car, for example, have individual functions but a car itself, as a whole, has its own function that determines whether or not it is a good car. Aristotelian Goodness On the basis of the previous argument, the good life for a human being is achieved when we act in accordance with our telos. However, rather than leaving the concept of goodness as general and abstract we can say more specifically what the good for a human involves. Aristotle uses the Greek term eudaimonia to capture the state that we experience if we fully achieve a good life. According to Aristotle, eudaimonia is the state that all humans should aim for as it is the aim and end of human existence. To reach this state, we must ourselves act in accordance with reason. Properly understanding what Aristotle means by eudaimonia is crucial to understanding his Virtue Ethical moral position. Ethics: Collected Readings 9 Eudaimonia has been variously translated and no perfect translation has yet been identified. While all translations have their own issues, eudaimonia understood as flourishing is perhaps the most helpful translation and improves upon a simple translation of happiness. The following example may make this clearer. Naomi is an extremely talented pianist. Some days, she plays music that simply makes her happy, perhaps the tune from the television soap opera “Neighbours” or a rendition of “Twinkle, Twinkle Little Star”. On other days, she plays complex music such as the supremely difficult Chopin-Godowsky Études. These performances may also make Naomi happy, but she seems to be flourishing as a pianist only with the latter performances rather than the former. If we use the language of function, both performances make Naomi happy but she fulfills her function as a pianist (and is a good pianist) only when she flourishes with the works of greater complexity. Flourishing in life may make us happy but happiness itself is not necessarily well aligned with acting in accordance with our telos. Perhaps, if we prefer the term happiness as a translation for eudaimonia we mean really or truly happy, but it may be easier to stay with the understanding of eudaimonia as flourishing when describing the state of acting in accordance with our true function. Aristotle concludes that a life is eudaimon (adjective of eudaimonia) when it involves “…the active exercise of the mind in conformity with perfect goodness or virtue”. Eudaimonia is secured not as the result of exercising our physical or animalistic qualities but as the result of the exercise of our distinctly human rational and cognitive aspects. Eudaimonia and Virtue The quotation provided at the end of section three was the first direct reference to virtue in the explanatory sections of this chapter. With Aristotle’s theoretical presuppositions now laid out, we can begin to properly explain and evaluate his conception of the virtues and their link to moral thinking. According to Aristotle, virtues are character dispositions or personality traits. This focus Ethics: Collected Readings 10 on our dispositions and our character, rather than our actions in isolation, is what earns Aristotelian Virtue Ethics the label of being an agent-centered moral theory rather than an act-centered moral theory. Act-Centered Moral Theories Utilitarianism and Kantian Ethics are two different examples of act-centered moral theories due to their focus on actions when it comes to making moral assessments and judgments. Act-centered moral theories may be teleological or deontological, absolutist or relativist, but they share a common worldview in that particular actions are bearers of moral value — either being right or wrong. Agent-Centered Moral Theories Aristotelian Virtue Ethics is an agent-centered theory in virtue of a primary focus on people and their characters rather than singular actions. For Aristotle, morality has more to do with the question “how should I be?” rather than “what should I do?” If we answer the first question then, as we see later in this chapter, the second question may begin to take care of itself. When explaining and evaluating Aristotelian Virtue Ethics you must keep in mind this focus on character rather than specific comments on the morality of actions. Aristotle refers to virtues as character traits or psychological dispositions. Virtues are those particular dispositions that are appropriately related to the situation and, to link back to our function, encourage actions that are in accordance with reason. Again, a more concrete example will make clear how Aristotle identifies virtues in practice. All of us, at one time or another, experience feelings of anger. For example, I may become angry when my step-son thoughtlessly eats through the remaining crisps without saving any for others, or he may feel anger when he has to wait an extra minute or two to be picked up at work because his step-father is juggling twenty-six different tasks and momentarily loses track of time (how totally unfair of him…). Anyway, as I was saying, back to Aristotle, “Anyone can become angry — that is easy. But to be angry with the right person, to the right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose, and in the right way — that is not easy”. Ethics: Collected Readings 11 For Aristotle, virtue is not a feeling itself but an appropriate psychological disposition in response to that feeling; the proper response. The correct response to a feeling is described as acting on the basis of the Golden Mean, a response that is neither excessive nor deficient. Anger is a feeling and therefore is neither a virtue nor a vice. However, the correct response to anger — the Golden Mean between two extremes — is patience, rather than a lack of spirit or irascibility. Virtues are not feelings, but characteristic dispositional responses that, when viewed holistically, define our characters and who we are. The Golden Mean ought not to be viewed as suggesting that a virtuous disposition is always one that gives rise to a “middling” action. If someone puts their life on the line, when unarmed, in an attempt to stop a would-be terrorist attack, then their action may be rash rather than courageous. However, if armed with a heavy, blunt instrument their life-risking action may be courageously virtuous rather than rash. The Golden Mean is not to be understood as suggesting that we always act somewhere between complete inaction and breathless exuberance, but as suggesting that we act between the vices of excess and deficiency; such action may well involve extreme courage or exceptional patience. In addition to feelings, Aristotle also suggests that we may virtuously respond to situations. We must keep in mind the agent-centered nature of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics when considering these examples. A person does not cease to have a witty disposition in virtue of a single joke that might err on the side of buffoonery, or cease to be generous because they fail to donate to charity on one occasion. Our psychological dispositions, virtuous or not, are only to be assessed by judgment of a person’s general character and observation over more than single-act situations. If we act in accordance with reason and fulfill our function as human beings, our behavior will generally reflect our virtuous personality traits and dispositions. Developing the Virtues In a quote widely attributed to Aristotle, Will Durrant (1885–1981) sums up the Aristotelian view by saying that “…we are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act but a habit”. It is fairly obvious that we cannot become excellent at Ethics: Collected Readings 12 something overnight. Making progress in any endeavor is always a journey that requires both effort and practice over time. Aristotle holds that the same is true for human beings attempting to develop their virtuous character traits in an attempt to live the good life. You may feel yourself coming to an Aristotelian Virtue Ethical view after reading this chapter and therefore be moved to become wittier, more courageous and more generous but you cannot simply acquire these traits by decision; rather, you must live these traits in order to develop them. Cultivating a virtuous character is something that happens by practice. Aristotle compares the development of the skill of virtue to the development of other skills. He says that “…men become builders by building” and “…we become just by doing just acts”. We might know that a brick must go into a particular place but we are good builders only when we know how to place that brick properly. Building requires practical skill and not merely intellectual knowledge and the same applies to developing virtuous character traits. Ethical characters are developed by practical learning and habitual action and not merely by intellectual teaching. In the end, the virtuous individual will become comfortable in responding to feelings/situations virtuously just as the good builder becomes comfortable responding to the sight of various tools and a set of plans. A skilled builder will not need abstract reflection when it comes to knowing how to build a wall properly, and nor will a skilled cyclist need abstract reflection on how to balance his speed correctly as he goes around a corner. Analogously, a person skilled in the virtues will not need abstract reflection when faced with a situation in which friendliness and generosity are possibilities; they will simply know on a more intuitive level how to act. This is not to say that builders, cyclists and virtuous people will not sometimes need to reflect specifically on what to do in abnormal or difficult situations (e.g. moral dilemmas, in the case of ethics) but in normal situations appropriate responses will be natural for those who are properly skilled. It is the need to become skilled when developing virtuous character traits that leads Aristotle to suggest that becoming virtuous will require a lifetime of work. Putting up a Ethics: Collected Readings 13 single bookshelf does not make you a skilled builder any more than a single act of courage makes you a courageous and virtuous person. It is the repetition of skill that determines your status and the development of virtuous characters requires a lifetime of work rather than a single week at a Virtue Ethics Bootcamp. Practical Wisdom (Phronesis) Aristotle does offer some specifics regarding how exactly we might, to use a depressingly modern phrase, “upskill” in order to become more virtuous. Aristotle suggests that the aim of an action will be made clear by the relevant virtuous characteristic as revealed by the Golden Mean; for example, our aim in a situation may be to respond courageously or generously. It is by developing our skill of practical wisdom (translation of “phronesis”) that we become better at ascertaining what exactly courage or generosity amounts to in a specific situation and how exactly we might achieve it. By developing the skill of practical wisdom, we can properly put our virtuous character traits into practice. For the Aristotelian, practical wisdom may actually be the most important virtuous disposition or character trait to develop as without the skill of practical wisdom it may be difficult to actually practice actions that are witty rather than boorish, or courageous rather than cowardly. Imagine trying to be a philosopher without an acute sense of logical reasoning; you would struggle because this seems to be a foundational good on which other philosophical skills rely. So too it may be with the virtues, practical wisdom supports our instinctive knowledge of how to respond virtuously to various feelings, emotions and situations. If this still seems to be somewhat opaque, then we may develop our sense of practical wisdom by looking at the actions of others who we do take to be virtuous. A child, for example, will most certainly need to learn how to be virtuous by following examples of others. If we are unsure in our own ability to discern what a courageous response in a given situation is, then we may be guided by the behavior of Socrates, Jesus, Gandhi, Mandela or King, as examples. If we learn from the wisdom and virtue of others, then just as a building apprentice learns from a master, so too virtue apprentices can learn from those more skilled than they in practicing virtue. Hopefully, such virtue apprentices will eventually reach a point where they can stand on their own two feet, with their Ethics: Collected Readings 14 personally developed sense of practical wisdom. Objection: Unclear Guidance Consider yourself caught in the middle of a moral dilemma. Moving to seek the advice of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics, you may find cold comfort from suggestions that you act generously, patiently and modestly whilst avoiding self-serving flattery and envy. Rather than knowing how to live in general, you may seek knowledge of what to actually do in this case. Virtue Ethics may therefore be accused of being a theory, not of helpful moral guidance, but of unhelpful and non-specific moral platitudes. In response, the virtue ethicist may remind us that we can learn how to act from considering how truly virtuous people might respond in this situation, but this response raises its own worry — how can we identify who is virtuous, or apply their actions to a potentially novel situation? Although a defender of Virtue Ethics, Rosalind Hursthouse (1943–) gives a voice to this common objection, putting forward the worry directly by saying that “‘Virtue Ethics does not, because it cannot, tell us what we should do… It gives us no guidance whatsoever. Who are the virtuous agents [that we should look to for guidance]?” If all the virtue ethicist can offer to a person wondering how to act — perhaps wondering whether or not to report a friend to the police, or whether or not to change careers to work in the charity sector — is “look to the moral exemplars of Socrates and Gandhi and how they would act in this situation”, then we might well sympathize with the objector since very often our moral dilemmas are new situations, not merely old ones repeated. Asking “what would Jesus do”, if we deem Jesus to be a morally virtuous role model, might not seem very helpful for an MP trying to determine whether or not to vote for an increase in subsidies for renewable energy technologies at huge expense, and potential financial risk, to the tax-payer (to take a deliberately specific example). Despite her statement of the objection, Hursthouse thinks that this is an unfair characterisation of Virtue Ethics. Hursthouse suggests that Virtue Ethics provides guidance in the form of “v-rules”. These are guiding rules of the form “do what is honest” or “avoid what is envious”. These rules may not be specific, but they do stand as guidance across lots of different moral situations. Whether or not you believe that this level of guidance is suitable for a normative moral theory is a judgment that you Ethics: Collected Readings 15 should make yourself and then defend. Objection: Clashing Virtues Related to the general objection from lack of guidance, a developed objection may question how we are supposed to cope with situations in which virtues seem to clash. Courageous behavior may, in certain cases, mean a lack of friendliness; generosity may threaten modesty. In these situations, the suggestion to “be virtuous” may again seem to be unhelpfully vague. To this particular objection, the Aristotelian virtue ethicist can invoke the concept of practical wisdom and suggest that the skilled and virtuous person will appropriately respond to complex moral situations. A Formula One car, for example, will be good when it has both raw speed and delicate handling and it is up to the skilled engineer to steer a path between these two virtues. So too a person with practical wisdom can steer a path between apparently clashing virtues in any given situation. Virtue ethicists have no interest in the creation of a codified moral rule book covering all situations and ins
