Description Topic: What Christian versions of Natural Law concepts are present in the religious and ...
Description Topic: What Christian versions of Natural Law concepts are present in the religious and political ideas of Augustine? Be sure to include a discussion of statesmanship and the Christian ideas of covenant and dual citizenship, temporal and spiritual. Instructions: *compose an original post presenting your own interpretation of the assigned prompt, writing 600–700 words *Original posts must include at least 3 references to the course readings and 1 Scripture reference in addition to any other sources you wish to include. Replies must include at least 1 reference to the course readings and 1 Scripture reference in addition to any other sources you wish to include. Scriptural excerpts with citations are required in all written assignments. *Turabian Style 4 attachments Slide 1 of 4 attachment_1 attachment_1 attachment_2 attachment_2 attachment_3 attachment_3 attachment_4 attachment_4 UNFORMATTED ATTACHMENT PREVIEW The City of God Please help support the mission of New Advent and get the full contents of this website as an instant download. Includes the Catholic Encyclopedia, Church Fathers, Summa, Bible and more — all for only $19.99... Book 1 Augustine censures the pagans, who attributed the calamities of the world, and especially the recent sack of Rome by the Goths, to the Christian religion, and its prohibition of the worship of the gods. He speaks of the blessings and ills of life, which then, as always, happened to good and bad men alike. Finally, he rebukes the shamelessness of those who cast up to the Christians that their women had been violated by the soldiers. Book 2 In this book Augustine reviews those calamities which the Romans suffered before the time of Christ, and while the worship of the false gods was universally practised; and demonstrates that, far from being preserved from misfortune by the gods, the Romans have been by them overwhelmed with the only, or at least the greatest, of all calamities — the corruption of manners, and the vices of the soul. Book 3 As in the foregoing book Augustine has proved regarding moral and spiritual calamities, so in this book he proves regarding external and bodily disasters, that since the foundation of the city the Romans have been continually subject to them; and that even when the false gods were worshipped without a rival, before the advent of Christ, they afforded no relief from such calamities. Book 4 In this book it is proved that the extent and long duration of the Roman empire is to be ascribed, not to Jove or the gods of the heathen, to whom individually scarce even single things and the very basest functions were believed to be entrusted, but to the one true God, the author of felicity, by whose power and judgment earthly kingdoms are founded and maintained. Book 5 Augustine first discusses the doctrine of fate, for the sake of confuting those who are disposed to refer to fate the power and increase of the Roman empire, which could not be attributed to false gods, as has been shown in the preceding book. After that, he proves that there is no contradiction between God's prescience and our free will. He then speaks of the manners of the ancient Romans, and shows in what sense it was due to the virtue of the Romans themselves, and in how far to the counsel of God, that he increased their dominion, though they did not worship him. Finally, he explains what is to be accounted the true happiness of the Christian emperors. Book 6 Hitherto the argument has been conducted against those who believe that the gods are to be worshipped for the sake of temporal advantages, now it is directed against those who believe that they are to be worshipped for the sake of eternal life. Augustine devotes the five following books to the confutation of this latter belief, and first of all shows how mean an opinion of the gods was held by Varro himself, the most esteemed writer on heathen theology. Of this theology Augustine adopts Varro's division into three kinds, mythical, natural, and civil; and at once demonstrates that neither the mythical nor the civil can contribute anything to the happiness of the future life. Book 7 In this book it is shown that eternal life is not obtained by the worship of Janus, Jupiter, Saturn, and the other select gods of the civil theology. Book 8 Augustine comes now to the third kind of theology, that is, the natural, and takes up the question, whether the worship of the gods of the natural theology is of any avail towards securing blessedness in the life to come. This question he prefers to discuss with the Platonists, because the Platonic system is facile princeps among philosophies, and makes the nearest approximation to Christian truth. In pursuing this argument, he first refutes Apuleius, and all who maintain that the demons should be worshipped as messengers and mediators between gods and men; demonstrating that by no possibility can men be reconciled to good gods by demons, who are the slaves of vice, and who delight in and patronize what good and wise men abhor and condemn— the blasphemous fictions of poets, theatrical exhibitions, and magical arts. Book 9 Having in the preceding book shown that the worship of demons must be abjured, since they in a thousand ways proclaim themselves to be wicked spirits, Augustine in this book meets those who allege a distinction among demons, some being evil, while others are good; and, having exploded this distinction, he proves that to no demon, but to Christ alone, belongs the office of providing men with eternal blessedness. Book 10 In this book Augustine teaches that the good angels wish God alone, whom they themselves serve, to receive that divine honor which is rendered by sacrifice, and which is called latreia. He then goes on to dispute against Porphyry about the principle and way of the soul's cleansing and deliverance. Book 11 Here begins the second part of this work, which treats of the origin, history, and destinies of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly. In the first place, Augustine shows in this book how the two cities were formed originally, by the separation of the good and bad angels; and takes occasion to treat of the creation of the world, as it is described in Holy Scripture in the beginning of the book of Genesis. Book 12 Augustine first institutes two inquiries regarding the angels; namely, whence is there in some a good, and in others an evil will? And, what is the reason of the blessedness of the good, and the misery of the evil? Afterwards he treats of the creation of man, and teaches that he is not from eternity, but was created, and by none other than God. Book 13 In this book it is taught that death is penal, and had its origin in Adam's sin. Book 14 Augustine again treats of the sin of the first man, and teaches that it is the cause of the carnal life and vicious affections of man. Especially he proves that the shame which accompanies lust is the just punishment of that disobedience, and inquires how man, if he had not sinned, would have been able without lust to propagate his kind. Book 15 Having treated in the four preceding books of the origin of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly, Augustine explains their growth and progress in the four books which follow; and, in order to do so, he explains the chief passages of the sacred history which bear upon this subject. In this fifteenth book he opens this part of his work by explaining the events recorded in Genesis from the time of Cain and Abel to the deluge. Book 16 In the former part of this book, from the first to the twelfth chapter, the progress of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly, from Noah to Abraham, is exhibited from Holy Scripture: In the latter part, the progress of the heavenly alone, from Abraham to the kings of Israel, is the subject. Book 17 In this book the history of the city of God is traced during the period of the kings and prophets from Samuel to David, even to Christ; and the prophecies which are recorded in the books of Kings, Psalms, and those of Solomon, are interpreted of Christ and the church. Book 18 Augustine traces the parallel courses of the earthly and heavenly cities from the time of Abraham to the end of the world; and alludes to the oracles regarding Christ, both those uttered by the Sibyls, and those of the sacred prophets who wrote after the foundation of Rome, Hosea, Amos, Isaiah, Micah, and their successors. Book 19 In this book the end of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly, is discussed. Augustine reviews the opinions of the philosophers regarding the supreme good, and their vain efforts to make for themselves a happiness in this life; and, while he refutes these, he takes occasion to show what the peace and happiness belonging to the heavenly city, or the people of Christ, are both now and hereafter. Book 20 Concerning the last judgment, and the declarations regarding it in the old and new testaments. Book 21 Of the end reserved for the city of the devil, namely, the eternal punishment of the damned; and of the arguments which unbelief brings against it. Book 22 This book treats of the end of the city of God, that is to say, of the eternal happiness of the saints; the faith of the resurrection of the body is established and explained; and the work concludes by showing how the saints, clothed in immortal and spiritual bodies, shall be employed. About this page Source. Translated by Marcus Dods. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 2. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight.. Contact information. The editor of New Advent is Kevin Knight. My email address is feedback732 at newadvent.org. (To help fight spam, this address might change occasionally.) Regrettably, I can't reply to every letter, but I greatly appreciate your feedback — especially notifications about typographical errors and inappropriate ads. Copyright © 2017 by Kevin Knight. Dedicated to the Immaculate Heart of Mary. Philosophical Review The Philosophy of Law of St. Augustine Author(s): Anton-Hermann Chroust Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Mar., 1944), pp. 195-202 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2182025 Accessed: 27-01-2019 23:25 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Philosophical Review, Duke University Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Philosophical Review This content downloaded from 208.95.50.183 on Sun, 27 Jan 2019 23:25:25 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms No. 2.] DISCUSSION I95 universal war and wholesale destruction of human life that is the greatest possible disaster, but only the most crushing experience of a particular person. If this view seems absurd it must be (on the interest-theory of value) because the evil of war, earthquake, famine, is described not in terms of the interests of the actual sufferers, but from the perspective of the spectator, who, moved by love to an interest in the welfare of all those persons affected by the cataclysm, finds his interest defeated in proportion to the number of those harmed.5 There is no scale upon which it may not be true that the pain of the lover on witnessing the loved one's suffering exceeds the pain of the sufferer. Of course such comparison actually is futile; but the important point is that, while it is not inconceivable that a way be found for effective comparison of these sufferings, there is no possible method by which the frustrations (or satisfactions) of different individuals may be added. If value is constituted by personal interest there are no terms by which value may be assessed except as relative to a particular individual. SIDNEY ZINK WASHINGTON, D.C. THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW OF ST. AUGUSTINE S T. AUGUSTINE truly stands on the threshold of ancient and medieval philosophy and theology. His most important and far reaching contribution to the problem of Christian metaphysics and ontology undoubtedly consists in his basic reformulation of the entirely impersonal "cosmic reason" of the Stoics, in his successful attempt to ground this "cosmic reason" exclusively on a purely theistic foundation. Thus the necessity as well as reason of all that exists and moves rests in the personal will and wisdom (or intellect) of God. The universal and eternal law governing all things created is but the divine wisdom: "Est enim lex universalis divina sapientia."' The divine will itself is the divine law: "Voluntas Dei ipsa est lex Dei."2 In the personal will and wisdom of God we find that instance which not only created, but also constitutes and maintains, the natural as well as the moral order of things, and which leads 'Indeed the influence of an individual's interest in the welfare of may lead him to impute for these persons good or evil to certain objects which are found to have contrary characters by the persons concerned. If value is relative to interest such -imputations must be false unless they take the form that in terms of "my" interest it is bad for another person to have interests such that certain experiences are Prood or evil for him 'De Diversis Quaestionibus, quaest. 79, I. 'Psalm 36, sermo 3. This content downloaded from 208.95.50.183 on Sun, 27 Jan 2019 23:25:25 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms i96 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LIII. everything to its proper, that is to say, to its divinely ordained, end. The wisdom or will of God, which is itself the eternal law governing and ordering the created Universe according to the divine plan, forms the most basic law, a law "which is called the supreme reason or intellect and which not only must always be observed, but through which also the wicked deserve the miserable, the righteous, however, the blessed life, and by virtue of which all that is called the temporal life is lived and modified in the right manner".3 Already the early Greek philosophers had spoken of an unwritten highest law of divine origin which precedes all human laws and which is coextensive with the "eternal order of things".4 Plato and Aristotle, the latter in a more indirect manner, are convinced of the existence and necessity of such a law. The Stoics, in particular, always referred to the "eternal cosmic law", which to them is identical with the "eternal reason" permeating the Universe, and which not only determines everything that exists or moves-including even God Himself-but also forms the ultimate norm of man's actions But this "lex aeterna" of the Stoics5a lacked one all-important aspect: the realization that it is the will and the wisdom of a personal Creator. St. Augustine, on the other hand, states, quite in accordance with his theistic philosophy, that the "eternal law is the divine reason and the will of God which commands the maintenance (observ- ance) of the natural order of things and which forbids the disturbance of it".6 Thus St. Augustine laid the foundation for the whole natural (moral) law of the following centuries by introducing the basic concept of a theistic "lex aeterna".7 'De Libero Arbitrio, I, 6, n. I5. 'See, for instance, Heraclitus, fragm. II4: "All human laws are "fed" by that one law of God."-Compare H. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorso- kratiker, 4th edit. c. i2. A. I, I. Pythagoras considered the "proportional" (mathematical) order of things the true essence of nature and, therefore, the eternal divine law. 'Compare, in general, Marcus Antoninus, Thoughts, II, 3; IV, 40; V, 32; XII, 30; IX, 28; II, I3; II, i6; II, I7; III, i6; 5, 27; IX, I. ,aSee, for instance, Ioannes Stobaios, Eclogae, II, 75, II f. in, Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragments I, No I79, 552, and III, No I2; Diogenes Laertius, 7, 87 (in: Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragment, I, No I79); Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, II, 22, i33 II, i86, ig f. (Speusippi fragments 57 L); Cicero, Academicorum priorum, liber II, 42, I3I; Seneca, De vita beta, 8, 2; Seneca, Epistola 20, 5; See also Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragments, III, No. i6, I No. 555, III, No. 57, III No. 2-28, 57-59, I, No. I79-i82, 552-556. 'Contra Faustum, XXII, 27: "Lex aeterna est ratio divina vel voluntas Dei, ordinem naturalem conservari jubens, perturbari vetans." 'St. Thomas Aquinas makes ample use of the Augustinian definition of the "lex aeterna". See, for instance, Summa Theotogica, I. II., quaest. 9I, art. I; art. 2 (where he quotes St. Augustine De Libero Arbitrio, I, 6, n. I5); art. 4; art. 5; quaest. 93, art. I (where he quotes St. Augustine); art. 2; art. 3; art. 4; art. 5; art. 6. This content downloaded from 208.95.50.183 on Sun, 27 Jan 2019 23:25:25 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms No. 2.] DISCUSSION I97 The "lex aeterna", which is the "ratio aeterna" of all things created, resides in everything that exists or moves in a "germinating manner" (ratio seminalis). The strictly personal will of God always remains the ultimate and eternal reason and, therefore, the eternal order of things. The "eternal law and eternal reason in the divine intellect directs everything to its proper end through proper (or consistent) mediating factors."8 Thus an eternal rational order is immanent in everything, an eternal, ontologically grounded and divinely ordained order which forms the "lex aeterna". Nothing occurs in the Universe save in accordance with this divine order which embraces and permeates all things. The "lex aeterna", the eternal and immutable "norm" and order of everything that exists or moves, is, however, not the only foundation of law and morals. For all that is "orderly" constitutes a "good"; and the most "orderly", the "lex aeterna", constitutes the highest "good", the "summum bonum". The "summum bonum", which is at the same time the source of all truth and, therefore, itself the im- mutable and eternal truth, is God Himself (bonum omni boni). Nothing exists above and beyond God. And only through God can any- thing created be called good.9 Man can do nothing that might be called good save that which God causes him to do. Hence God Himself is the "lex aeterna", the ultimate norm of all that is good, the absolute justice. For in Him the "lex aeterna" and the "summum bonum" are one and the same.'0 The comprehension of this "summum bonum" through the rational being forms the necessary presup- position for the understanding of the "individual good", that is to say, for any act of evaluation. On the other hand, the changing nature of all that occurs eternally reminds us of the unchanging nature of the "summum bonum"."1 The moral value of man's action and volition is not to be found in the "freedom" of his action, but in the ultimate determination of his will through this eternal order and ordination, in his acceptance of this order which is itself the "summum bonum". In this idea of the "summum bonum", which is the absolute and objective (ontological) "good", St. Augustine expresses his firm belief in the "perseitas boni", in the absoluteness of all basic legal and moral laws or norms.'2 The "lex naturalis" or natural (moral) law of St. Augustine is, 8De Libero Arbitrio, I, c. 5. 9De Trinitate, VIII, 3 and 4. "0De Vera Religione, II, n. 2i; De Libero Arbitrio, II, 9, n. 26; De Trinitate, XIV, 15, n. 2i. Confessiones, XI, io. 2Compare, for instance, Contra Mendacium (Liber at Consentium i8: "Whoever declares that not only theft but also false and adulterated testimony and every other evil thing are not bad, but rather good-whoever may say such things but a man who undertakes to subvert human affairs as well as all morals." This content downloaded from 208.95.50.183 on Sun, 27 Jan 2019 23:25:25 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 198 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LIII. so to speak, the conscious "participation" of rational man in the "lex aeterna". The natural law is imprinted in our soul, or, to be more exact, is the imprint of the "lex aeterna" on our soul. The "lex aeterna" constitutes "that ineradicable and sublime administration of all things which proceeds from divine providence".'3 From this absolute administration there is in-and transcribed on-the rational soul of man the "lex naturalis", "in order that all men in this way of life (conversatio vitae) and within the scheme of earthly morals might serve as images of such an administration of all things".14 Thus we find in ourselves not only the guiding principles of all practical laws or norms, but also the idea of right and justice itself. Justice is "but a habit of the soul which imparts to every one the dignity due to him,'14 yet always with reference to the common good. Its origin proceeds from nature. For reasons of the common utility (or good), some of its different aspects (or contents) turn afterwards into custom; and finally, this notion of justice is sanctioned by the fear of the law and by religion. Nature (the eternally fixed and stable order of things) is law, which is not the product of man's personal opinion, but something implanted (in man) by a certain innate power."'15 Injustice is, therefore, the absence of man's right conception of the eternal order of things, of the "lex aeterna" which manifests itself to man in the form of the "lex naturalism For, like everything evil, injustice is derived from a lack of concord in the relation of different things to each other, as well as in the relation of the different things to God. The soul is intuitively aware or conscious of this idea of "natural justice". Not even the worst malefactor could completely deprive himself of this idea,16 since it is primarily a rational law which not even wrongful action may destroy.'7 Our notion of the existence of natural justice and natural law comes to us through the "natural light" of human reason, while by means of our moral conscience we "remember" the "lex aeterna" as being always immanent in the "lex naturalis" and in natural justice.'8 St. Augustine's concept of right and justice culminates in his statement that one must impart to every one his due."8a This primarily 'De Diversis Quaestionibus, quaest. 53, 2. '4De Diversis Quaestionibus, quaest. 53, 2. Compare St., Paul's Epistle to the Romans II I4, I5. 14a This statement might have been taken from: Digest i, I, De Iustitia et Iure, io (Ulpian Lib. I Regularum); Institutes, i, I, De Iustitia et Iure. 6 De Diversis Quaestionibus, quaest. 3I. 6De Trinitate, XIV, I5. Epistola, I57 (ad Paulinam, de videndo Deo), n. i8, in: Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 44 ;-See also Cotfessiones, II, 4. 1 De Trinitate, XII; 15. 18a Compare Digest i, I, De Iustitia et Iure, IO: "Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi." This content downloaded from 208.95.50.183 on Sun, 27 Jan 2019 23:25:25 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms No. 2.] DISCUSSION I99 formalistic and abstract definition of the nature of right and justice needs, nevertheless, a more precise and concrete explanation. It is not altogether surprising that St. Augustine grounds his definition of what constitutes the content of right and justice exclusively in the natural order of things as ordained by God Himself. In accord- ance with this basic standpoint he calls the "lex naturalis" that law which is just, in order that everything and every one might be most orderly (ut omnia sint ordinatissima).19 The observance as well as the perfection of the divinely ordained moral and natural order of things forms the true essence of the Augustinian concept of law and justice. In conformity with this idea St. Augustine discovers in the rule, "do nothing unto another you would not have done unto your- self", a second basic definition of the fundamental content of his natural law and natural justice. He says: "The law is also in the intellect of man who makes use of his opinion (as regards such matters) and freedom. Through this law, which is inscribed in the heart (of man), it is suggested that he do nothing unto another he would not have done unto himself."2 In another place he- states that "in every intercourse with other men as well as in every way of life it is sufficient to abide by that one common saying: no one would. do unto another what he would not suffer himself."2' These two definitions, namely to impart to every one his proper due, and not to do anything unto another you would not have done unto yourself, constitute the content of all natural law and natural justice. They are its basic principles or, as St. Thomas would say,22 the "primary natural law". Every other natural-law precept is but a conclusion drawn from these basic principles.23 The whole order of things, the moral as well as the natural, consists, according to St. Augustine, in a hierarchy of different degrees of perfection.24 Each degree of perfection in its highest manifestation reaches the next higher degree or level of perfection. The highest degree of perfection is the "summum bonum", that is God Himself, the "ipsum bonum" or "immutabile bonum" beyond which no further perfection is possible. "God ordained and made everything . . . and He ordained everything in different degrees from earth to heaven, from the visible to the invisible, from the mortal to the immortal." This "interrelation of everything that is created, this most orderly beauty which ascends from the lowest to the most ' De Libero Arbitrio, I, 6, I5; See also Psalm I45, 5. OEpistola, I57, 3, I5, in Migne, vol. 44. ' De Ordine, II, 2, 25; see also Psalm i iS, serm. 25, 4. " Summa Theologica, I. II. quaest. 94, art. 2; art. 4. ' This notion was adopted by St. Thomas Aquinas. See, for instance, Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 94, art. 4. See in general De Quantitate Animae. This content downloaded from 208.95.50.183 on Sun, 27 Jan 2019 23:25:25 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 200 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LIII. sublime, and which descends from the most sublime to the lowest, and the continuity of which is never disrupted, but in all its dissimilitudes balanced, in its entirety praises Gdd."25 The affirmation of the infinite interrelation or interwovenness of all individuality within this cosmic order ordained by God, to- gether with the eternal struggle for the ever higher and finally for the highest "good", constitutes the goodness, righteousness, and justice, of any human action. We are conscious of our own position within this universal order of things, a position which also determines our very essence in our relation to the highest good, to God. Thus the idea and principle of justice, which is but the idea and principle of the absolute ordained order of everything that exists or moves, forms part of our very nature. And since order is the truly beautiful and perfect, our conscious awareness of this order and of justice constitutes the true beauty of our soul.26 As to the relation of the "lex naturalis" to human law, St. Augustine states that in temporal matters nothing could be considered just and righteous which had not been derived from the eternal principles of justice and order, that is to say, from the "lex aeterna". "For if the people at one time were right in obeying, and then again at another time were right in not obeying, this phenomenon, or vicissitude of time, must have been derived from what is eternal in order to be just; because it is always just to obey seriously minded people, and to disobey lightminded people. Since this (the lex naturalis) is the one law from which all temporal laws to rule man proceed in their variety. .."27 In order to be just, every temporal or human law must proceed from and be in conformity with the "lex naturalism All other laws, which are not derived from this "source of all justice",28 should be ignored by everyone.29 In spite of man's having the basic precepts and principles of natural law and justice imprinted on his soul, and in spite of his ability to draw certain conclusions from these first principles of right and just action, St. Augustine stresses the necessity of a temporal or human law. In the beginning, he says, there were no written laws (lex formata in literis), because the law was itself inserted in the very nature of all created things. But later this law became obscured in the mind of man through evil inclination and vices, which fact stood ' Psalm i44, 13-This passage also shows the influence of Plotinus on St. Augustine's 'cosmic thought'. ?ADe Trinitate, VIII, 9. 2De Libero Arbitria, I, 6, 15. 2JDe Civitate Dei, XIX, 21. 29Epistola 105, II, 27, in Migne, vol. 44: "Christian soldiers served under the pagan emperor; when he wished them to worship idols or to burn incense these soldiers preferred God to the emperor and thus distinguished between the eternal and the temporal Lord; but nevertheless they were also subjected to the temporal Lord in account of the will of the eternal Lord." This content downloaded from 208.95.50.183 on Sun, 27 Jan 2019 23:25:25 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms No. 2.] DISCUSSION 201 for the necessity of a human law. A law had to be given to man by man, that he might know the law and might have an established authority; and that what had become obscured might once again become manifest. Since man is what he is, natural law does not make the human law superfluous. On the contrary, natural law itself stands in need of such a human law in order to be able to actualize itself.30 Only while in full accordance with the eternal and immutable rules and precepts of right and justice may the temporal lawgiver determine what for the time being ought to be the law.31 But the human or temporal law cannot prohibit or control everything that is prohibited or controlled by the "lex aeterna".32 For the temporal or human law does not concern itself primarily with the promotion of virtue and the virtuous life, but merely with the prevention of obvious abuses and the crudest maladjustments. The Augustinian distinction between the Civitas Dei (or Civitas Coelestis), which denotes the community of those ordained to a life of eternal blessedness,33 the community of those who yearn towards Christ and cleave to Him, and the Civitas Terrena34 is too well known to need discussion. We have always to keep in mind, however, that the Augustinian Civitas Terrena is not identical with the political community, the secular State, but must be interpreted in a purely ethical and religious sense,35 that is to say as the community of the declared enemies of God, the "societas impiorum".86 The political community, the secular State, is the product of man's social instinct, which is a natural, divinely ordained instinct forming a part of the created Universe.37 Consequently, the secular State constitutes a "natural institutional which is in its way good. For the temporal order of things, the social order among mortal man, also belongs to the hierarchical order of the created Universe. And this order, or to be more exact, the compliance and maintenance of this order, constitutes the goodness and beauty of all things created. Through this orderthe temporal as well as the eternal-and through his compliance with it man, as a rational being, becomes the true jewel of creationA9 3 De Vera Religione, 31, 58. De Vera Religione, 31, 58. 32De Civitate Dei, XV, i6; De Libero Arbitrio, I, 5, 13; ibid. I, 5, 31 De Civitate Dei, XII, i. See, for instance, De Civitate Dei, XIV, 28. ',See, for instance, De Civitate Dei, XV, i. De Civitate Dei, XVI, IO, XIX, 24. See also the works of 0. Schilling (Die Staats- und Soziallehre des hi. Augustinus, Freiburg, 1910, p. 41 f.), B. Seidel ("Die Lehre vom Staat beim hi. Augustinus", in Kirchengeschichtliche Abhandlungen, IX, i, I909, edit. by Sdralek), H. Scholz (Glaube und Unglaube in der Weltgeschichte; Ein Kommentr xu 2Augustins De Civitate Dei). aDe CiiAtate Dei, XV, i6; XIX, 5 f. ' See also De Trinitate, XII, 2; De Libero Arbitrio, II, 4. De Civitate Dei, XIX, 13; De Genesi od Litteram, IX, 9, I4. This content downloaded from 208.95.50.183 on Sun, 27 Jan 2019 23:25:25 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 202 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW The Civitas Dei as well as the secular (political) State exists in this world. Both have to c
